Explaining land use change in Mexico requires understanding the behavior of the local institutions involved. We develop two theories to explain deforestation in communities with and without forestry projects, where the former involves a process of side payments to non-members of the community and the latter of partial cooperation among community members. Data collected in 2002 combined with satellite imagery are used to test these theories. For the forestry villages, we establish a positive relationship between the distribution of profits as dividends instead of public goods and forest loss. For communities not engaged in forestry projects, deforestation is largely related to the ability of the community to induce the formation of a coalition of members that cooperates in not encroaching. This happens more easily in smaller communities with experienced leaders. A disturbing result of the analysis is that deforestation is higher when a community engages in forestry projects, even after properly accounting for self-selection into this activity. This suggests that forestry projects as they now exist in Mexico are not sustainable and contribute to the deforestation problem.
INTRODUCTION
The 1990s saw a flurry of activity in the economic modeling of deforestation with early efforts focused on cross-country analyses and second wave models moving to micro-level approaches (Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) , Barbier (2001) ). The current paper is in the latter category, but with a twist. Specifically, while the vast majority of the land-use change literature views deforestation with little behavioral modeling, this study looks at both household and community level behavior. The unusual data set and unique situation in Mexico, where most forests are held in common property, allow us to make two contributions to understanding deforestation.
First, there is a sharp contrast between the mechanisms that lead to deforestation in communities in which the forest is mostly removed by households to expand their agricultural or cattle activities and communities that extract wood as a commercial activity. We thus introduce two models of community behavior that explain the way these two types of communities organize to reach their socially optimal level of land use in common property settings. In communities where forests are not managed for forestry, demand for socially excessive forest conversion may be mitigated by cooperation within the community. Where forests are a business, the distribution of profits can be used as a tool to minimize individual incentives to encroach on the forest.
The second contribution is the use of the community as the unit of analysis rather than the "pixel" (see Cropper et al (2001) , Monroe et al (2002) , Godoy and Contreras (2001) , Vance and Geoghegan (2002) ) or municipality (Deininger and Minten (1999) ). The vast majority of these papers on deforestation take as their starting point Chomitz and Gray's (1996) seminal deforestation model, where a profit-maximizing farmer chooses between different land use activities. This study differs substantially from theirs, in that it recognizes that the decision process comes from the interaction between individual households and authorities in a community. Analyzing the community level interactions reconciles the unit of analysis and the unit at which decisions are made.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we discuss the Mexican forestry context (section 2), develop two theories of community behavior (section 3), describe the data, and show summary statistics (section 4). We then present the estimation strategy (section 5), the results (section 6), and conclude with possible policy implications (section 7).
THE MEXICAN FORESTRY CONTEXT
This study focuses on the Mexican ejidos, rural communities resulting from a drawn-out land reform that extended from the end of the 1910 Revolution until the early 1990s. During this time, an area equivalent to half the country was redistributed to peasants. Ejidos are composed of two different kinds of property rights over land: private parcels and commons. Private land is mostly dedicated to agricultural activities. Within these same communities there also live many people who are not members of the ejido, usually descendants of the original members (ejidatarios) who were prevented from becoming members by the legal restriction on inheritance to only one child. The non-members do not have voting rights and are not formally given land, but in practice they often farm on ejido lands. The commons are mainly dedicated to pasture and forest. Importantly for the case at hand, they house 80% of Mexico's remaining forest.
Though there has been much debate regarding approximations of Mexico's deforestation rate, there is no doubt that, conservatively estimated at 1.3%, it is among the highest in the world (Torres-Rojo and Flores-Xolocotzi, 2001 ). The estimated rate in the sample is 1.2% per year. Given the country's decreasing soil quality and increasing water scarcity, problems both associated with forest loss, understanding the sources of deforestation is becoming a central policy issue at the national level. In addition, Mexico is among the most biologically diverse countries in the world, with first place in reptilian diversity, third in bird, and fourth in mammal diversity. Its plant diversity exceeds that of the United States and Canada combined (CNF, 2001 ). This suggests that there are significant negative externalities to deforestation in Mexico and justifies our focus on measures to mitigate forest loss.
TWO THEORIES OF COMMUNITY BEHAVIOR
During fieldwork in 2002, we observed sharp contrasts between communities that manage their forests as a business and those who simply have forest in their common land. They are classifed as forestry and non-forestry ejidos, respectively. Non-forestry management systems are those where there is no formal structure for tree extraction aside from what is provided by a set of basic rules approved by the community assembly. Each ejidatario works individually subject to these rules and his personal financial constraints. Forestry ejidos are those that have received a forest exploitation permit from the government and organized extractive forestry.
(a) Forest conversion in non-forestry ejidos: a theory This discussion is framed by a theory of partial cooperation, which is based on Barrett's (1989 Barrett's ( , 1994 work on emissions agreements in Europe. Other authors who have expanded this approach include Carraro and Siniscalco (1993) and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (1996) . The nature of the community problem, however, leads us to a different concept of stability than is found in their work. Based upon field interviews, we posit that the driving force behind deforestation in nonforestry is the individual incentives to encroach on the forest beyond what would be socially optimal.
These incentives come from the individual need to expand agricultural and pasture land, whether it be for profit or insurance, and from the over-extraction of wood for domestic use. In many villages, one observes a core group of households who seem to work together, setting and obeying rules limiting the amount of cattle in the commons or wood extracted for domestic use. Moreover, this group exists despite the fact that there are often people around it who are not obeying the rules. This is the concept of a coalition of cooperators.
The logic of the model is as follows. Households derive benefits from the forest. These benefits may vary across households and include current benefits such as firewood, house-building materials, and non-wood products as well as future benefits. Both current and future benefits depend upon the quality of the forest, accessibility, and its state at time zero. There may also be benefits -4 -11/7/03 from cutting the forest, or encroachment, which include profits from agriculture and cattle, or insurance from cattle. These benefits are decreasing with the size of parceled or private landholdings and increasing with family size, population growth and the quality of potential agricultural or pasture land. Finally, there is a cost to encroachment that encompasses the work needed to remove forest and the potential punishment incurred from being caught encroaching. This potential can be increased by strong leadership (see Bianco and Bates (1990) ).
These conditions sort the households into three distinct groups depending upon where they receive the highest net benefits: those who have nothing to gain from encroachment, those who will always be better off encroaching than cooperating, and those who, as a group, will be better off cooperating than encroaching, even when others are encroaching. The first group is comprised of households who have a low demand for common land because they either support themselves with outside jobs, have sufficient private land, or the potential agricultural land is too far away to make it worth the effort of going and clearing it. They accrue no gains from cutting down the forest, and potentially benefit from its continued existence. We call them "passive cooperators", as no incentive is needed to induce them to curb their deforestation activities. The second group is composed of households with high cattle to land ratios, or high household size to land ratios, or little chance of accessing future benefits (e.g., they may not be ejidatarios). They are better off cutting down more trees than not. For this reason, we label them "encroachers".
The last group is composed of cooperators. Cooperation gains are defined by the difference between a cooperator's benefits when he is part of the group that does not encroach on the forest (or clears at a lower level), and the benefits he would receive if cooperation broke down and all members of the group were to cut forest at their optimal individual level. These households have access to current and future benefits, with high costs to encroaching. While the structure of benefits makes these households prefer a cooperative solution, it is not sufficient to prevent individual defaulting at the margin on the group's decision. This is the usual incentive that leads to the non-cooperative equilibrium, even in the case of recognized benefits from cooperation. The sustainability of the coalition requires, as in most cooperation cases, an enforcement mechanism. The coalition of cooperators is thus composed of households that have voluntarily given themselves a mechanism of enforcement and punishment that prevents the unraveling of their collective choice. They typically commit to the cooperative encroachment level by a show of hands in the assembly. This type of mechanism is not unusual in developing countries (see Baland and Platteau (1996) for similar examples).
How might the behavior of these three groups affect deforestation? Here, encroachment is equal to forest loss. The socially optimal level of encroachment is the solution to the problem:
The first order conditions
optimum is thus found where each household's marginal benefit is equal to the ejido's marginal losses from deforestation plus the household's marginal encroachment cost.
At the other end of the spectrum, in the non-cooperative equilibrium, the household maximizes benefits from encroaching without taking into account the impact on others:
This solution, e i , is defined by
however, that the forest benefits function depends upon the size of the forest minus total encroachment, which implies that the household's decision depends upon the decisions of everybody else -the less the others encroach, the lower are the marginal forest benefits, and hence the more the household encroaches. The solution results in a reaction function that depends on factors that affect individual benefits from forest and pasture, forest and pasture quality, encroachment costs, punishments, and the encroachment choices of the other households, which of course depend upon their respective characteristics:
where
is the sum of the other households' encroachment decisions.
Comparing the cooperative solution derived from (1) and the non-cooperative solution (3), we can divide the households between those that would get higher benefits from cooperation and those that would prefer the non-cooperative higher level of encroachment. A partial cooperation equilibrium can emerge if a group of households would prefer the cooperative solution within their 
where J and K denote the respective sets of cooperators and encroachers, and E the level of encroachment of the cooperative coalition. The encroachers individually solve an optimization problem similar to (2), taking as given the encroachment levels of the coalition and of the other individual encroachers. The equilibrium solution sets the optimal encroachment level for each of these groups, and hence the partial cooperation aggregate level of encroachment:
The three groups are defined by the following conditions:
1. Passive cooperators, i ∈I , are worse off encroaching than doing nothing for any level of the others' encroachment:
2. Cooperators, j ∈ J , are defined by those who are better off at the cooperative level than they would be if everyone encroached:
Encroachers, k ∈ K , are defined by the opposite inequality.
We modify equation (5) for the empirical analysis to give per member which, for M members, is:
Since the cooperative encroachment level is less than the individual encroacher's level, deforestation decreases with the size of the coalition. The levels of encroachment of the encroachers and the coalition members are a function of the household characteristics that affect their demands for common land, the quality of the land itself, and the characteristics of all other households in the community. The size of the coalition, which is itself endogenous, depends upon forest benefits, the quantity of good agricultural/pasture land, household characteristics that change land demand, and strong leadership, which may increase the cost of not participating in the coalition. It is here that we observe the effects of features traditionally associated with cooperation, such as group size (Olson, 1965) and inequality (Bardhan et al. (2002) ).
(b) Forest conversion in forestry ejidos: another theory A forestry management system is one where there is a community "forestry firm" made up of either some or all of the ejido members. The central problem for these firms is to maximize their profits over the long term. From this point of view, all other things held equal, this management regime should be the most likely to operate like a single, profit-maximizing owner. There are, however, two important differences between the profit-maximizing owner and the ejido. First, ejidos are given a harvest limit by the government and must follow a management plan that includes reforestation, among other activities. If they exceed this limit, or do not reforest sufficiently, they are threatened by the loss of all future profits through removal of their permit. These limits, however, are not necessarily the optimal level that the ejido would choose. Since enforcement is not perfect, ejidos will optimally take a certain level of risk in not complying with the limits, hoping to get away with a certain amount of forest loss.
The second complication of the "owner's" problem is the constituency composed of those who receive direct benefits from the forest project, the ejido members, and those who receive benefits only indirectly, the non-members. As in the case of the non-forestry ejidos, households encroach on common lands for grazing animals and planting crops. Conversion of forest for these activities increases the reforestation responsibilities of forest managers. For this reason, forest managers have an incentive to try to reduce the conversion of forested land by individual activities. They do this through a bribe.
It is quite easy to bribe members through the division of profits among them; it is the nonmembers, who often vastly outnumber members, who create the problem. One finds many communities that invest heavily in public goods in lieu of dividing up all of the profits. There are two possible reasons behind this behavior. First, there are returns to scale in investment in public goods, and hence, in large communities, public goods may generate more benefits that cash distribution. Second, only members are legally owners of the forest product, and it would be very difficult to determine who among non-members could qualify for profit sharing. This suggests that leaders may be acting to minimize encroachment incentives by "paying off" non-members through investment in public goods. The tradeoff is between angering members who see part of their dividends being diverted to non-members, and reducing incentives for non-members have less of an incentive to remove trees clandestinely from the forest.
We model the relationship between forest managers and households in a principal agent framework where forest managers choose optimal levels of harvesting, reforestation, and the profit sharing rule, anticipating the behavior of community members.
Consider the households' decision. Their incentives to encroach depend upon their own costs and benefits, as in non-forestry ejidos, and also upon how their actions affect the forest stock in future periods. This turns their problem into a dynamic one, since their actions today affect the size of the forest in the next period, and hence the size of forest profits. Suppose there are M ejidatarios and N non-members, and that the percentage of profits that go to dividends is γ 3 . The resource constraint is , where F is the forest stock in period t+1, and , and
H t E t 3 Note that the sum of members and non-members in the forestry model is equal to the sum of the three different groups in the previous model: M+N = J+I+K. R t are the harvest for forestry, total encroachment, and reforestation in the previous period,
respectively. An ejidatario m choose the optimal encroachment level to maximize his net benefit given the division of profits and the current harvest level: with respect to encroachment e m . This implies that the benefits from cutting one hectare today must be equal to the sum of the lost benefits from having the same piece of forest today, the costs incurred in cutting it, and the discounted value of the decrease in the future forest stock.
The corresponding expression for non-members is the solution to:
( ) is interpreted in the same way as V F t +1 ( ) above. Note that profit dividends do not appear in the non-member's value of the forest. The first order condition is: (9) and (11). Note that non-members unequivocally lose from an increase in the share γ of the profits that go into dividends, and one can show that their encroachment increases in response to an increase in γ . For the members, we can make no such statement, as the sign of the marginal effect depends on the initial amount of the public good and their marginal utility from it.
At the ejido level, managers know households' reaction functions. Their objective is to maximize forest extraction profits taking into account the fact that if they harvest more than the permit level, or don't reforest enough, it is likely that they will have their forestry permit revoked in the next period. Let q H t + E t − R t ;z q ( ) denote the probability that a community will be successful in evading detection of poor management and continue harvesting in the second period, with the discount rate of β . The vector includes characteristics that increase the probability that excessive deforesting remains undetected. Finally, k R z q t ;z k ( ) is the forest management cost function which is increasing in reforestation and characteristics z that might make these activities more difficult. The ejido's problem can be written as follows:
where and q(⋅) < 1 ′ q < 0 when H t + E t − R t > H t , and q = 1, otherwise.
The first order conditions for γ , H , and R are:
The first expression shows that the optimal profit allocation rule γ is the level that minimizes aggregate encroachment. This is obtained where the sum of the marginal encroachment effect of an increase in dividends for members is equal to the sum of the effects of this change on non-members' encroachment. The intuition is that leadership needs to find a level where increasing the public good to the detriment of the dividends begins to increase the encroachment of the members by more than it decreases that of the non-members. If we assume for a moment that all members are identical and all non-members are also identical, then the optimal profit distribution depends on the ratio of members (M) to non-members (N):
If all of the encroachment demand functions are concave, the proportion of profits allocated to dividends increases as the ratio of members to non-members increases. It is possible that at some point, as membership size increases, it will be optimal to distribute ejido profits through public goods, as the value of the goods to members may exceed the cash value of the dividends when they are divided among many people.
The term − ′ q U − q ′ U ( ) represents the marginal future benefits of reforestation (or cost of harvesting): the decrease in the probability of losing the permit plus the increase in the future stock of trees to be harvested. Equations (15) and (16) state that current marginal return to harvesting and marginal cost of deforestation must equal the marginal future value of these decisions, respectively.
Equations (14), (15), and (16) jointly solve for the optimal harvesting H t * , reforestation , and allocation of profits to dividends. These three choices define the optimal encroachment level
and the total forest loss from one period to the next:
To summarize, in this model deforestation depends upon the harvest level, household encroachment, and the ejido's reforestation efforts. All three are jointly determined and hence a function of all exogenous variables. However, the specific variables associated with deforestation are prices, characteristics that affect the probability of getting caught by the forest service for not complying with the management plan, the size of the forest stock, and the discount rate. Those associated with encroachment are individual characteristics, the quality of available agricultural land, the forest stock and the division of profits between dividends and public goods. Finally, those affecting reforestation are the cost of forest management, the factors that affect the probability of getting caught, the size of the forest stock, and the discount rate. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics that affect deforestation in the two models, along with the associated model variables. We assume that the choice of management system results from the community maximizing the sum of their households' expected utility given household and community characteristics. This decision takes into account their expected deforestation in each regime, which implies that all of the characteristics that considered above are part of the decision process. There are also important fixed costs in entering the forestry regime. Hence, only ejidos that have a forest of sufficient value (size, quality, and accessibility) to sustain a large operation, resources to invest in the heavy equipment that is necessary for a forestry project, and the human capital (qualified workers and entrepreneurhip) required by this demanding activity will choose the forestry regime. In addition, forestry will only be chosen if the land does not have too high a potential value in conversion to agriculture or pasture.
The following schematic ties together the series of decisions described in the previous pages.
-14 -11/7/03 Note that only about 20% of ejidos in the sample have forest management. Their overall deforestation, however, accounts for 34% of total forest loss in the sample. In terms of per capita forest loss, the difference is not significant, but it is suggestive of higher loss per capita in forestry ejidos. The nature of the models dictates that the analysis be done on a per capita basis; therefore, deforestation from this point on will refer to forest loss per ejidatario between 1993 and 2000. Table 4 presents summary statistics for ejidos with different levels of deforestation in the non-forestry regime. Communities in the high deforestation category appear to be farther away from larger cities, have more good agricultural land, and smaller individual parcels. These ejidos also have a higher density of cattle per hectare and a higher proportion of the population using the commons for agricultural or pastoral purposes.
TABLE 4 HERE
In order to define a proxy for cooperators, we appeal to the household questionnaire, where we asked members if they used the commons for any activity, be it pasture, agriculture, or forestry.
Users and non-users were further divided into those with more than one hectare of land per adult and those with less. We then organized in Table 5 This categorization suggests that a proxy upper bound for the number J is the sum of the land-scarce non-users plus the land-rich users, while the land-scarce non-users can be used as a lower bound. Similarly, an upper bound for the encroachers (K) is the sum of the land-scarce users, the land-rich users, and the non-members, while a lower bound is just the group of land-scarce users.
Because the estimation is of forest loss per member, we will be using the ratio of these totals to membership. Table 5 gives the summary statistics of these groups by deforestation level and includes their categorization from the theoretical section. It is interesting to see that heavy users (those with less than one hectare per capita) increase as deforestation per member increases. Also notable is the -17 -11/7/03 decrease in "active cooperators", those who don't use the commons but have small land holdings, between the high and low deforestation categories. Finally, we see that land rich users of the commons, included in the potential upper bound of cooperators, decrease steadily as deforestation increases.
TABLE 5 HERE
For forestry regimes, the key dynamic comes from the distribution of profits between public goods and dividends. The model predicts that an increase in the share of dividends in profits for a given community should be associated with increasing deforestation with given membership structure. Figure one shows deforestation per capita graphed against the share profits distributed as dividends. Without holding membership constant, we do indeed see increasing deforestation as the share of dividends rises.
FIGURE 1 HERE
AN EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
As the choice of forestry vs. non-forestry regime is endogenous, the estimation model includes this decision. The variables affecting this choice, including fixed costs and factors affecting the profitability of forestry, are contained in the vector W. We assume that the decision of entering a forestry regime is derived from a linear net benefits S * as follows:
where α is a vector of parameters to be estimated. The deforestation equations are written:
where the subscript f indicates a forestry ejido and n a non-forestry one, ∆L is hectares of forest loss per member between 1993 and 2000, X are vectors of variables identified in the two models as determining the level of deforestation, and β vectors of parameters. The error terms u and ε are all assumed to have zero mean. The selection process creates correlation between u and each of the ε in the sample used for estimation. We estimate these equations as a system using maximum likelihood.
Two variables that appear in the land change equations are not readily available in the data, and require a preliminary estimation. The first is the poverty indicator for the ejido (note that the Conapo index used in the descriptive statistic is available at the municipality or locality levels, but not at the ejido level). A good indicator would be the fraction of ejido population that qualifies for Progresa (an anti-poverty program that targets poor households). This program, however, only covers marginal localities, and some of the ejidos in the sample do not receive it. Based on information collected in the household survey for those communities that receive Progresa, we estimate the probability that a household be a Progresa beneficiary, and then predict this probability for all households in the sample (results not reported). We use the average predicted probability at the community level as a predicted poverty rate. The second variable that requires attention is the number of cooperators and encroachers. While there is information on land ownership and commons use for the households in the household survey (used in the classification given in Table   5 ), commons use is endogenous to the process of deforestation. It therefore needs to be instrumented before being used as a regressor. The use of predicted values in the main regressions requires that we bootstrap the entire estimation process, which is done 1000 times for each estimated equation. The results are discussed in next section.
RESULTS
The predictive regression of the use of commons for agriculture or pasture by household in non-forestry ejidos is presented in Table 6 . As expected, the probability that a household uses the commons decreases with its parcel size (the effect is negative for parcels up to 50 hectares, far above the observed range). Those who have previously held leadership positions are more likely to use the commons. With regards to community level variables, we see that the probability of use increases with total ejido size, though not by very much. In the sample, 12% of the communities have the legal status of "indigenous community". While in many ways these communities are managed like ejidos, they have a few different rules. Notably, allocation of parcels to members is less permanent than in ejidos, and the land in fallow is returned to the commons. Because of this, parcels are often smaller, and commons larger. We thus control for this status, although the variable is not significant in this estimation. The two aggregate leadership variables suggest a negative effect of leader education and experience on land use, though the latter is not significant and the effects are not very large.
In order to create the group size proxies, we calculate the average of the predicted probabilities among households with plot size larger or smaller than one hectare per adult, in each ejido. We then tabulate the upper and lower bounds of the cooperating and encroaching groups as described above. Since the dependent variable of the regression is deforestation per member, these average probabilities reflect the percentage of members who are predicted to be in each of the groups of interest. We find support for the hypotheses stated in the regime choice section. The largest effect is for forest quality. Being a young ejido, which suggest low forest quality, decreases the probability of choosing forestry by 14 percentage points. Ejidos found in tropical zones are much less likely (20 percentage points) to enter into forestry. Absolute size and more importantly land at high altitude increase the probability of forestry. Finally, leadership seems important -having leaders ten years younger increases the probability of choosing forestry by nearly 10 percentage points.
TABLE 7 HERE Table 8 shows the estimates for deforestation in non-forestry ejidos, following the classification of variables introduced in Table 1 . 5 The key variable of the theory, the size of the group of cooperators, has the expected significant negative effect. Both upper and lower bound variables reveal a similar effect. An increase of .10 in the proportion of cooperators among members decreases forest loss by approximately 3 hectares per capita. Compared to the average forest loss per capita of 4.4 hectares, this effect is quite important. In the case of the encroaching group, the point estimate for the upper bound is positive but imprecise. As the lower bound of encroacher is just one minus the upper bound of the cooperators, we do not use this variable. Among physical characteristics of the ejido, an increase in good agricultural land per capita, reflecting an increase in the opportunity cost of the forest, increases deforestation. The number of households with small plots per adult and population pressure captures the demand for land. For ejidos with more than a few parcels smaller than 1ha/adult (10-20% from the better first two equations), an increase in the number of small parcels increases deforestation. The population growth effect, as reflected in municipal population growth over the period, is consistently positive. The non-significance of the estimated covariance between the error terms indicates no evidence of unobservable characteristics of the ejidos that would both condition the choice of regime and the deforestation level.
5 Among the expected community variables, we omitted the number of members, as it was not significant and could cause spurious correlation with the endogenous variable of deforestation per capita. Inequality is captured by the proportion of small parcels. Aggregate variables for the household individual encroachment levels are share of small parcels, municipal growth rate (as a proxy for population pressure in the ejido), and education as a proxy for employment opportunities.
INSERT TABLE 8
In order to estimate deforestation in forestry regimes, we use the variables identified in the two models of community behavior representing physical, community, and household characteristics.
Here we exclude the variable used to describe forest quality due to the fact that there is not sufficient variation in it for this part of the sample -only 3 of the forestry ejidos are less than 25 years old.
Because of the small number of degrees of freedom and their lack of significance, number of members and municipal population growth rates are not included either. Including these variables does not significantly affect the sign, magnitude or significance of the other exogenous variables.
Since profit allocation is an endogenous choice, we instrument for it using the ratio of members to non-members, the difference in age between leaders and ejidatarios, and the age of leaders. Table 9 shows the results, following the classification of variables reported in Table 1 . Most of the estimated parameters have very large standard errors, probably due to the small sample size.
We see, however that the key variable in the theory, the share of profits in dividends per ejidatario, has the predicted positive sign and is significant in both estimates. The point estimates imply that if we increase each ejidatarios' share of dividends by .5 (doubling the mean), deforestation increases by 1 to 3.5 hectares per capita. Among the physical characteristics, good agricultural land per capita suggests a positive effect on deforestation in forestry ejidos, reflecting the opportunity cost of forests in these communities. As expected also, poverty as a proxy for high discount rate, also suggests a positive effect. One might worry about the possible endogeneity of poverty in this regression, as well as in the previous one. In order to check the robustness of the results, we ran these regressions without the poverty variable and found that none of the point estimates of the remaining variables were significantly altered. The negative covariance with the error term of the selection variable indicates that the unobserved factors that induce ejidos toward choosing to undertake a forestry project contribute to lower the deforestation rate.
Finally, one can simulate the effect of incorporating as members some of the current nonmembers, a solution to commons management problems suggested by Muñoz-Piña et al. (2002) . If all of the forestry communities were to incorporate 100 new members from among the nonmembers, then the average predicted deforestation per capita would decrease by 2.8 hectares. This results from both a change in the predicted amount of dividends and in the amount of land per capita. Because the effect of the membership ratio is highly non-linear, an increase of 100 members actually decreases the amount of profits allocated to dividends by nine percent.
According to the analysis, this high deforestation in ejidos with forestry projects results from the dilemma posed by the presence of non-community members living in the ejidos and from the prevailing high discount rates associated with poverty. A disturbing fact is that ejidos with forestry projects have higher deforestation rates than non-forestry ejidos. We observed this in the descriptive statistics. This is also confirmed by the regression analysis in which we control for self-selection into forestry. The predicted average deforestation for ejidos in forestry is 6.8 hectares per capita over a seven year time period. Using the model of deforestation for non-forestry ejidos, and properly correcting for self-selection into the forestry regime, their predicted level of deforestation if they were non-forestry instead of forestry would be 7.1 hectares per capita. For non-forestry ejidos, the predicted average deforestation per capita is 4.5 hectares, lower than that of the forestry ejidos, even if they choose not to do forestry. Should all of the non-forestry communities suddenly begin forestry projects, their predicted average deforestation per capita would increase to 16.2. These results are shown in Table 10 . This table also shows the decomposition of the difference in predicted deforestation for ejidos in and out of their own regimes. Non-forestry ejidos have higher deforestation when they are put in forestry regimes as a result of observables (more non-members and less hectares in forest) and unobservables. Similarly, forestry ejidos are predicted to have higher deforestation in non-forestry regimes due to their higher agricultural land per capita and large proportion of population with small parcels (observables), as well as the same large differences in the unobservable characteristics that make them choose forestry. This could indicate that as currently managed and regulated, the forestry projects are not sufficiently profitable for ejidos to maintain their resource and ensure its long term sustainability.
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of our analysis is that one cannot understand land use change in Mexico without taking into account the heterogeneity of those that own the forests and the specificity of their decision-making process. We have developed two theories to describe deforestation in communities with and without forestry projects, where the former is a story of conflict management and the latter of partial cooperation. We find that large ejidos from non-tropical ecological zones with more area at high altitude and younger leaders are more likely to have a forestry project. Younger ejidos, however are much less likely to exploit their forest, probably because they have inherited low quality forest. For ejidos that choose not to have forestry exploitation, we show that deforestation is largely related to the ability of the community to induce as large a group of households as possible to cooperate in not encroaching. The members of that coalition are more likely to be younger households with migrants in the U.S., enough private land, but not having exercised a leadership position. The coalition is also larger in small ejidos with experienced leaders.
When ejidos with non-members present in the community choose to enter forestry, the main determinant of their deforestation is their choice of how to divide up profits between dividends and public goods. Holding all else constant, a larger investment in public goods helps reward nonmembers for not encroaching and decreases forest loss per member. In addition, incorporation of new members into forestry ejidos can help decrease deforestation. We are also presented with a puzzle with regards to productive forestry. While it is true that forestry ejidos would deforest more even if they did not do forestry, we also find that non-forestry ejidos, were they to enter into forestry, would have significantly higher deforestation per member. This suggests that forestry projects as they now exist in Mexico are contributing to the deforestation problem because they are not sufficiently profitable relative to land use in agriculture and pasture. We conclude that serious analysis and reform of the current forestry incentive and regulation systems is imperative. The categories were created as follows: Encroachers are users of the commons with parcels ≤ one hectare/household adult. A household member has held leadership position
TABLES AND FIGURES

Ejido characteristics
Total area of ejido (1000 ha)
Area of ejido at high altitude (1000 ha)
Good agricultural land (ha per capita)
Number of members in 1990
Proportion of leaders with primary education in 1990
Proportion of leaders with previous experience in 1990
Average age of leaders in 1990
Inequality in parcel size (Gini coefficient)
Proportion of parcels ≤ 1 ha/adult (Proportion of parcels ≤ 1 ha/adult)^2
Community is not an indigenous community community is an ejido, proportion of households with secondary education, proportion of households with less than one hectare of land per capita, and its square, ratio of non-members to members, number of non-members and municipal population growth rate. .06 (-.10, .21) .05 (-.10, .27) 
Municipal characteristics
20.4
Ejido is in tropical zone -1.91 (-13.4, 6.1) -1.07 (-12.3, 6.5) . .52
Households
Proportion of households with secondary education -2.43 (-13.0, 4.6) .34 (-9.2, 14.0) .46
Proportion of parcels ≤ 1 ha/adult .51 (-22.9, 22.3) 1.98 (-24.4, 30.6) .
49
(Proportion of parcels ≤ 1 ha/adult)^2 -3.10 (-23.7, 17.6) -4.93 (-31.6, 18.9) .37
Covariance with the error term of the selection equation º Dividends instrumented by the ratio of members to non-members, the difference in age between leaders and members, and the age of leaders. Bootstrapped 95 % confidence intervals in parenthesis. **Indicates significance at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
